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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Authority for this appeal is found within the confines 
of Section 77-35-26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Utah State Constitution Article I, Section 77-1-6(g); and 
Section 78-2a-3 Utah Code Annotated, and the rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
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Text of Statutes 
United States Constitution, Amendment Six: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the state and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel in his defense. 
United States Constitution Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated and no warrant shall issue that upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution: 
The right of the people against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person 
or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-3: 
Conditions precedent to issuance: 
a. A search warrant shall not issue except upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation 
particularly describing the person or place to be 
searched, and the persons, property, or evidence to 
be seized. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT I 
The Court allowed the co-defendant's statement to 
be introduced as evidence over the defendant Nield's 
objection. The co-defendant did not testify, and the 
defendant Nield did not have the opportunity to cross-
examine said witness-defendant Likes. 
POINT II 
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion to 
suppress. The defendant moved to suppress on the basis 
of an illegal search and seizure conducted at the 
defendant's residence. Defendant contends that the 
warrant authorizing said search was not sufficiently 
particular violating the rights of the defendant 
guaranteed under the Utah State Constitution and the 
United States Constitution. 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for burglary of a 
business, a third degree felony. Proceedings were held in 
the District Court in and for Millard County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The owner of Fillmore Diesel received a tip from an 
anonymous caller telling him his business would be broken 
into on the evening of May 17, 1988. He notified the police 
of this and they agreed to watch his business on the night in 
question. They checked it periodically throughout the 
evening. On one of the checks, they discovered the building 
had, in fact, been burglarized. 
The police notified the owner of Fillmore Diesel. After 
consulting with a "Confidential Informant" the police 
believed defendant Nield was the guilty party. The police 
presented their information to the Justice of the Peace, 
Ronald R. Hare. A search warrant was issued authorizing the 
search of Nield's residence. (Suppression Hearing T.3 L.17) 
Based on the evidence found at Nield?s residence, he was 
arrested. Arrested with defendant/appellant Nield was co-
defendant Likes. At the trial, the prosecution introduced 
the evidence (a bolt cutter) obtained during the search of 
Nield's residence. 
The prosecution also introduced the confession of co-
defendant, Likes. . (Trial T.221 L.15 — T.223 L.2) Likes was 
present at the trial and defendant/appellant, Nield, did not 
have the opportunity to cross-examine Likes. 
The defendant/appellant motioned the Court to suppress 
evidence (bolt cutters). The basis therefore being that the 
warrant failed to particularize the property to be seized. 
The identification of the property to be seized was limited 
to "shop equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk calculator, 
auto tools stolen from Gerald Freeman." The officer picked 
up the bolt cutters sought to be suppressed, took them to the 
alleged victim Freeman, and then made the determination to 
seize the bolt cutters. (Suppression Hearing T.14 L.9-14; 
also T.17 L.9-13) The defendant moved to suppress and the 
trial court denied the same. 
2 
No particular inventory of specific property had been 
completed. (Suppression Hearing T.4 L.16 and T.6 L.12) No 
specific particular description was given as to "shop 
equipment" nor "air tools". (Suppression Hearing T.8 L.2-13) 
The bolt cutter had no distinguishing marks. (T.10 L.21-25) 
The actual identification of the bolt cutter by victim 
Freeman was one to two days later. (Suppression T.36 L.l-5) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The defendant was tried and convicted by a jury. The 
jury was allowed to hear the confession of co-defendant 
Likes. Co-defendant Likes was present but declined to 
testify thereby denying the defendant/appellant an 
opportunity to cross-examine. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the 
accused the right to confront his accusers. Without the 
opportunity to cross-examine, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and followed by the Utah Supreme Court, have 
determined a conviction cannot stand. 
The warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's 
residence failed to particularize the property to be seized. 
The terms "shop tools" or "auto tools" stolen does not 
sufficiently guide the officers in his search and seizure of 
property. 
The conviction of Nield must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
In the process of a trial, the accused is guaranteed 
certain rights under the Constitutions of both the United 
States and Utah.1 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him . . . (emphasis 
added) United States Const. Amend. VI. 
In one of the earliest decisions where the court went 
into detail on the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the court 
discussed the purpose behind its enactment. 
The primary object of the constitutional provision 
in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte 
affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in 
civil cases, being used against the prisoner in 
lieu of a personal examination of the witness, in 
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of 
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience 
of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face 
to face with the jury in order that they may look 
at him, and judge by his"demeanor upon the stand 
and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief. Mattox v. United 
1
 This brief deals with the guarantees under the United States 
Constitution, Amendment Six. The rights allowed under the 
Utah Constitution and the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure may 
be greater and if necessary will be briefed at later time. 
See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986). 
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States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339 
(1895). 
The right of cross-examination is included in the right 
of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses 
against him. A major reason underlying the constitutional 
confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with crime 
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. 
Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S.400, 85 S.Ct. 1065. 
Introducing a co-defendant's testimony at trial without 
the opportunity to cross-examine is precisely what the Sixth 
Amendment is designed to protect. See Douglas v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 1074, 85 S.Ct. 1074. In Douglas, the defendants 
were charged with assault with intent to murder. They were 
tried separately. The defendant, Lloyd was tried first and 
found guilty. At Douglas's trial, the State called Lloyd as 
a witness against Douglas. Lloyd refused to testify and 
invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. Under the guise 
of refreshing Lloyd's recollection, the prosecution 
questioned Lloyd, asking him to confirm or deny statements 
read by the prosecutor from a document purported to be 
Lloyd's confession. These statements inculpated Douglas in 
the crime. The Court held that Douglas's inability to cross-
examine Lloyd denied Douglas the right of cross-examination 
secured by the confrontation clause. 
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In 1959, the Supreme Court ruled a co-defendant's 
confession could be introduced into evidence by the 
prosecution. This would not violate the Sixth Amendment as 
long as the judge gave the jury an instruction to only use 
the co-defendant's against the one who confessed. Delli 
Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294. 
Eventually the Court recognized the fallacy of this 
reasoning and expressly "overrule[d] Delli Paoli and 
reverse[d]". Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 
1620, at 1622. 
The government should not have the windfall of having 
the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, 
as a matter of law, they should not consider but which they 
cannot put out of their minds. The naive assumption that 
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the 
jury all practicing lawyers recognize as unmitigated fiction. 
Id. (citing cases). 
The Court cited with approval Judge Learned Hand, "The 
limiting instruction is a 'recommendation to the jury of a 
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but 
anybody else's.' Nash_v„.__ United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 
(2nd Cir. 1983)". Bruton v. United States, at 138, 88 S.Ct. 
1620, 1629. 
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To attempt to force the jury into segregating evidence 
into separate intellectual boxes. Determining a confession 
is true insofar as it admits that A has committed criminal 
acts with B, and at the same time effectively ignore the 
inevitable conclusion that B has committed those criminal 
acts with A an impossible task. "Indeed, we have expressly 
declared that to deprive an accused of the right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law." See 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 405, 85 S.Ct. at 1068.2 
The Bruton holding, not allowing the introduction of a 
co-defendant's confession without a right to cross-examine, 
has been discussed in great detail in the cases which 
followed the decision.3 
2
 A co-defendant's confession when used against the defendant 
is analogous to a compelled confession. "[i]t is now 
axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of 
due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or 
in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for 
the truth or falsity of the confession." Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774 (1964). Without the opportunity 
to cross-examine co-defendant Likes. Appellant Nield was 
denied due process of law as well as the right to confront 
his accusers. 
3
 An exception to the rule established in Burton is not 
controlling but should be noted. The court will allow the 
admission of the co-defendant's testimony at trial even if 
the person who confessed is not present. Provided the 
accused was given the opportunity to cross-examine the 
confessor at a preliminary hearing. See California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (1970). 
l 
Clarifying why the right to confront a witness is so 
important, the reasons cited by the Court are: (1) to insure 
the witness will give his statements under oath (2) forces 
the witness to submit to cross-examination,4 (3) permits the 
jury deciding the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of 
the witness in making his statement, aiding the jury in 
assessing credibility. California v. Green 399 U.S. 149, 
158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1985 (1070). 
The cases following Bruton are collected in the most 
recent case where the Supreme Court has discussed these 
issues. See Richardson v. Marsh U.S. , 107 
S.Ct 1702 (1987).5 
In Richardson the Court carved out a narrow exception to 
the Bruton rule. After extensively discussing the reasoning 
and holding of Bruton. The Court found it is not applicable 
in all situations. "We hold that the Confrontation Clause is 
not violated by the admission of a non-testifying co-
defendant 's confession with a proper limiting instruction 
when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not 
only the defendant's name, but any reference to her 
existence." Id. at 1709 (emphasis added). 
4
 "The greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery 
of truth". 5 Wigmore §1367. 
5
 The analysis of the court, in Bruton, and the holding; is 
summed up very forcefully by the dissent at 1709-14. 
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The Court also made it clear that before a statement is 
to be affected by the Bruton requirement that it be subject 
to cross-examination, it must be powerfully incriminating and 
expressly implicate the defendant. Id. at 1707. 
Clarifying its position that Bruton is still good law 
subject only to a narrow exception. The Court in the case 
reported immediately after Richardson v. Marsh held, a co-
defendant 's interlocking testimony cannot be admitted against 
a defendant in a joint trial, unless it is admissible under 
Bruton. "We hold that, where a non-testifying co-defendant's 
confession incriminating the defendant is not directly 
admissible against the defendant, see Lee_JS^Jilinpisf 106 
S.Ct. 2056 (1986), the Confrontation Clause bars its 
admission at their joint trials, even if the jury is 
instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even 
if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him." 
See Cruz v. New York, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 1714, 1719 
(1987). 
At the appellant's trial, co-defendant Likes' confession 
was introduced as evidence against Nield. The confession was 
not "redacted" so as to reduce the "express implication" and 
"powerfully incriminating" force of its introduction. 
Richardson v. Marsh, at 1707. 
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STATE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In deciding the extent of the rights guaranteed to a 
defendant under the Sixth Amendment, the Utah Courts have 
followed the United States Supreme Court's decision and 
declined to expressly decide the issues presented under 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.6 State v. 
Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987) See also State v. Kendricks, 
538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1975). 
Ellis was not a case which directly implicated a Bruton 
issue because the testimony which implicated the defendant 
was not a co-defendant's confession, the testimony was 
offered by a police officer testifying at trial as to the 
defendant's statements during arrest, and the statements did 
not directly implicate the defendant in the commission of the 
crime. Id. at 190. 
The Court discussed the defendant's contentions in light 
of the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings. It is clear the law in 
Utah under the Sixth Amendment is controlled by Bruton.7 
The Utah Supreme Court is also willing to allow a co-
defendant 's testimony in to convict a defendant, provided the 
6
 See footnote 1, supra. 
7
 For a collection of the cases which follow the Bruton 
rational, and the subsequent development of a more precise 
rule see Ellis at 190. 
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co-defendant is present at trial and subject to cross-
examination. State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988) 
(and cases cited therein). 
In Kendricks, the Supreme Court faced a problem similar 
to the one presented by this case. A defendant's alleged 
accomplice refused to testify at trial. The State then 
introduced the alleged accomplice's testimony at the 
accomplice's previous trial. The defendant objected claiming 
the introduction of said testimony was a violation of the 
defendant's constitutional and statutory rights to confront 
witnesses against him. 
In Kendricksf the Court held that the right of 
confrontation could not be violated. The Court cited the 
provisions of Section 12 of Article I of Utah Constitution, 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
also Section 77-1-8 of the Utah Code Annotated, which 
provided that in criminal prosecutions the defendant would be 
entitled to be confronted by the witnesses against him. 
Said section has been repealed and replaced by the provision 
of Section 77-1-6. 
The new provision provides that the defendant shall have 
the right to be confronted by witnesses against him. 
The Court in Kendricks found that the right of 
confrontation is a fundamental right and is essential to a 
11 
fair trial. The right of confrontation is based upon the 
notion that the accused should have the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. The Court found that the 
defendant had no opportunity to confront the co-defendant, 
nor did his counsel have the opportunity to cross-examine 
him. 
The case was reversed and remanded for new trial. It is 
also interesting to note the language of the Court in its 
holding: 
While it-is likely that the evidence was sufficient 
to sustain the verdict against the defendant, 
nevertheless we cannot appraise the effect upon the 
jury of the reading of the testimony of Travis in 
these proceedings. We are of the opinion that it 
was prejudicial error to permit the testimony of 
Travis to be read into the record in this case as 
no sufficient foundation had been laid to justify 
its admission. 
POINT II 
A search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to 
conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment is unconstitutional. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 
468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424. A warrant must particularly 
describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to be 
searched. Dalia v. United States, 411 U.S. 258, 99 S.Ct. 
1682 (1969). 
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In State v. Gallegos 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court reviewed a search warrant for the seizure of 
"all controlled substances and stolen property." While 
searching the home, the officers noticed a Magnavox VCR 
attached to a television set and two video tapes close by. 
The officer asked the defendant Gallegos about them and 
Gallegos remarked that he had rented them from Norton's 
supermarket. The officer then called the police dispatcher 
and asked her to verify this information with Norton's. An 
assistant manager at Norton's advised the dispatcher that 
Norton's had not rented the VCR to Gallegos based on the fact 
that there was no rental agreement on file with the name of 
Gallegos. This inquiry took ten to fifteen minutes. After 
receiving the information, the officer examined the VCR and 
discovered that the serial number was missing. The defendant 
and his girlfriend were unable to produce a rental receipt 
for the VCR and the officer seized the VCR and the tapes. 
(The officer in Gallegos did as the officer in the 
instant case did. He seized the evidence to see if he could 
connect it with a crime. Such conduct is the exact act which 
the Fourth Amendment seeks to deter and prohibit.) 
The following day, the officer called several stores in 
the Provo area trying to determine if the VCR was, in fact, 
stolen. Eventually the ownership of the VCR and the tapes 
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were traced to another store, Sounds Easy. (This fact is 
similar to Officer Cory's seizure of the property and then 
checking later with Mr. Freeman to see if it was stolen 
property.) 
The Court found that the particularity of description 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is essentially a 
proscription against general warrants whereby administrative 
officers determine what is and what is not to be seized. The 
decision to seize must be judicial, as opposed to 
administrative, and a warrant must be sufficiently particular 
to guide the officer to the property intended to be seized, 
thereby minimizing the danger of an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy. 
Defendant suggests that the property to be seized must 
be set out in the warrant previous to its issuance and not 
decided on an "after the fact" basis by the officer and the 
alleged victim as was done in the Gallegos and the instant 
case. 
Regarding the use of generic terms in the search 
warrant, the Utah Court, citing State„v._ Namen, Alaska App., 
665 P.2d 557 (1983), held: 
Without substantial justification, warrants 
describing property only in generic terms (terms 
applicable to an entire class of property) are not 
favored by law. However, use of such descriptions 
14 
have been allowed when a more specific description 
of the thing to be seized is unavailable. Thus, 
general descriptions have been held sufficient in 
cases involving contraband such as drugs . . . in 
cases where the inherent nature of the property 
sought by a warrant precludes specific description 
. . . in cases where attendant circumstances 
prevented a detailed description from being given . 
. . and in cases where detailed, description has 
been difficult and the evidence established that 
the stolen goods sought are likely to be part of a 
larger collection of a similar contraband located 
at the premises to be searched. (Emphasis added). 
The Utah Court found that the description "stolen 
property" was unconstitutionally deficient. The court found 
that it was "obvious" that the Fourth Amendment's requirement 
for "particularity" was abridged in that case. 
An officer does not have unbridled discretion when 
conducting a search of a residence to determine what property 
is to be seized; such a decision is for the judiciary. The 
officer is limited by the warrant and he has no authority 
except by its terms. Thus, generic descriptions allowing the 
officer to decide what should be searched, and then seized, 
are not favored. Here, the officer had to seek out the owner 
to decide whether the property had been stolen and then 
decide what should be seized. The decision to seize was not 
determined by the warrant but by the officer. General 
warrants to investigate and rummage are unconstitutional. 
Clearly, the property to be seized as "stolen property" is 
15 
unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently describe 
the property and allows an officer unbridled discretion. 
State v. Gallegos. 
The next issue is whether the application of a generic 
description (air toolsf shop tools, or auto tools) is 
sufficient to save the warrant meeting the particularity 
requirement. The general premise of the law is that generic 
descriptions do not suffice and are not favored. .State_vJL 
Gallegos; State v. Namen; supra. Only under limited 
exceptions do generic descriptions suffice. State v. 
Gallegos, State v. Namen. 
The search warrant herein identifies the property in 
only generic terms, i.e. "shop equipment, air tools, . . .and 
auto tools stolen from Gerald D. Freeman, Fillmore Diesel, 
Fillmore, Utah, on 5/17/88, during a burglary, and any 
illegal controlled substances." An inventory was being or 
had been completed of the items stolen from the Fillmore 
Diesel by Mr. Freeman (Mr. Freeman was unclear as to when he 
had completed the inventory.) Said inventory itemized the 
property stolen as to the particular tool or instrument with 
specificity. 
Officer Scott Corey testified that he went to the 
residence, picked up all shop equipment, air tools, and auto 
tools, and then took them to Mr. Freeman for his 
16 
identification as to which would be stolen property, similar 
to what was done in Gallegosf wherein the officer sought out 
stores to see if the VCR was stolen. After Officer Corey 
picked up all items that fit within the generic term "shop 
equipment, air tools, and auto tools," Mr. Freeman reported 
that none of the property had been stolen excepting possibly 
the bolt cutters. The bolt cutter is not particularly 
identified by Mr. Freeman since it is not distinguishable 
from any other bolt cutter by mark or identifiable sign. 
There exists the question of whether "bolt cutters" fall 
within the definition of "shop equipment". 
Defendant submits that the exceptions noted in Gallegos 
do not apply here: (1) The items to be seized are not 
contraband such as drugs; (2) The inherent nature of the 
property is not such that it precludes a more specific 
description. In fact, an inventory was being prepared, 
itemizing the particular tool or instrument; (3) The 
attendant circumstances did not prevent a more detailed 
description. The inventory was being completed; (4) A 
detailed description would not have been difficult nor was it 
stolen goods likely to be part of a larger collection of a 
similar contraband located at the residence. Consequently, 
defendant submits that the general proposition that generic 
descriptions are not favored should be followed and that the 
17 
court should find that no exception as defined by the Utah 
Court has been met. 
The court in Gallegos cited United States v. Cook, 657 
F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981) in support of the proposition that 
generic terms in warrants are generally prohibited by law. 
In Cook the items to be seized were VCR cassette tapes. The 
description in the warrant allowed seizure of illegally 
obtained VCR tapes (the actual description is not included 
due to its length and it being of little value to this 
determination.) 
The Federal Court in Cook propounds again the premise 
that the use of generic terms is acceptable only when a more 
specific description of the things to be seized is 
unavailable. In Cook the Court held that the warrant was 
constitutionally flawed. The Court found that the warrant's 
use of generic terms in providing for the seizure of 
"illegally obtained films . . . not limited to the motion 
pictures described in the affidavit" provided the searching 
agents with little guidance and was unconstitutional. 
The defendant herein suggests that Cook bears relevance 
to the instant case due to the similarity of the descriptions 
supplied in both of these warrants. In Cook the warrant 
provided for the seizure of "stolen VCR tapes" and in this 
case the warrant provided for the seizure of "stolen tools." 
18 
The Court in Cook held that such a description was generic in 
nature and therefore unconstitutional and the Court should 
find the warrant in this case to be unconstitutional for the 
same reasons. 
In Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557 (Alaska App. Ct. 1983), 
the Court found that the specificity at which the search 
warrant is directed serves to protect against possibilities 
of a general exploratory search and assures that articles of 
property outside the legitimate scope of a warrant are not 
subject to mistaken seizure. These exact dangers existed in 
the present case. 
Search warrants describing property only in the generic 
terms, that is, in terms generally applicable to the entire 
type or class of property rather than specific items, are 
disfavored in the absence of substantial justification. 
Unlike contraband, such as narcotics, there is nothing about 
the nature or physical characteristics of stolen property 
that renders it inherently identifiable as being stolen; thus 
characterizations of property in search warrants as having 
been stolen at a, given time or from a given place wjLl 1 noi 
normally suffice to satisfy the requirements of 
particularity, since such characterizations do not enhance 
the officer's ability to distinguish between property 
unlawfully held that is subject to seizure and property of a 
19 
general class that is lawfully held and not subject to 
seizure. 
In Namen, the Court found that the search warrant for 
the defendant's residence did not satisfy the constitutional 
requirement. The Court found that an inventory could have 
been made available and that a description of the property to 
be seized as jewelry stolen from a particular residence on a 
particular date is not constitutional. 
The facts of Namen parallel the facts present in Cook 
and the present case. Descriptions of stolen jewelry, stolen 
VCR tapes, or stolen tools or equipment from an alleged 
victim on a particular date are unconstitutional because they 
do not limit the officer or give him any guidance in the 
limits of his search. 
The Court in People v. Coletti, 39 Misc.2d 580, 241 
NY.S.2d 454 (1963), found that the terms "stolen furniture 
and household goods" are generic terms and deficient. See 
also State v. Kealoah, 613 P.2d 645 (Hawaii 1980). 
The State and Federal Constitutions both require that a 
particular description be set out in a search warrant to 
limit and assist the officer executing the warrant. Warrants 
must specifically describe the property to be seized or they 
are unconstitutional. The officer has no authority except 
through the warrant. 
20 
Therefore, we start with the presumption that generic 
terms are disfavored. Warrants containing generic terms are 
to be upheld only if one of the exceptions as set out above 
are met. It is the defendant's position that the warrant in 
this case contains generic terms and does not fall under any 
of the exceptions. Pursuant thereto, the defendant asks this 
Court to declare the warrant unconstitutional and to suppress 
the evidence seized under said warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error by admitting 
co-defendant Likes' confession into evidence. Appellant 
Nield is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution a right to confront the witnesses against him. 
This right includes the right to cross-examine the witness. 
Admitting the confession of Likes into evidence without an 
opportunity to cross-examine, violated appellant's right of 
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
his right of confrontation guaranteed under the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Based on the decisions of the United State Supreme 
Court, and the courts of Utah, the conviction of Nield must 
be overturned. 
The Warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's 
residence lacked specificity to guide the officer in the 
21 
search and seizure of property. It allowed the officer to 
make the judicial decision as to what should be seized. The 
warrant failed to distinguish between property to be seized 
and other property. Generic terms do not meet constitutional 
standards of particularization. The motion to suppress 
should have been granted. 
Respectfully submitted this ol\ day of November, 
1989. 
SH 
Attor: 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing on this St ) day of 
, 1989, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage id. 
prepaid to the following: 
Mr. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
236 North State 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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ADDENDUM PURSUANT TO RULE 24(F) 
The defendant-appellant relies on the following portions of the 
transcipt to support his arguments. 
1. Search Warrant and Affidavit in support thereof authorizing 
search of the defendant's residence. 
2. Portion of transcript detailing the confession of the co-
defendant Richard Likes. Transcript of trial pages 221 lines 15 to 
page 223 line 2. 
3. Portion of transcript detailing the officer confiscating bolt 
cutters, taking them to victim Freeman to make the derermination of 
whether they had been taken in the burglary. Transcipt of 
Suppression Hearing page 14 line 9-14/ page 17 line 9-13. 
- . Portion of transcript detailing that no particular inventory 
had been completed prior to the warrant being issued. Suppression 
Hearing page 4 line 16 and page 6 line 12. 
5. Portion of transcript detailing that no particular description 
was give as to the terms "shop equipment" nor "air tools*. 
Suppression Hearing page 8 lines 2-13/ 
6. Portion of transcipt derailing that the bolt cutters had no 
distinguishing marks. Suppression Hearing page 10 line 21-25. 
7. Portion of transcript detailing that the bolt cuiters were 
identified by the victim Freeman one to two days after the search. 
Suppression Hearing page 36 lines 1-5. 
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Secretary- Geralyn Bills 
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IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT, fflmm PRECINCT, C O P Y 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 
COUNTY*OF MILLARD, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer 1n the State of Utah. 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
Deputy Scott Corry , I am satisfied that there 
1s probable cause to believe that 
I J on the person(s) of 
J on the premises known ss 
I I^ in the vehicle(s) described as 1974 Oldsmobile Cutlass, 
brown and tan in- color, YIN 3J57U4R187382 registered to 
Kevin Wield, 
in the City of Fillmore , County Hf Millard 
State of Utah, there is now being possessed or concealed certain 
property or evidence described as: 
shop equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk calculator, auto 
tools stolen from Gerald D. Freeman, Fillmore Diesel, FiUmsre, 
Utah on 05/17/88 during a burglary snd any i l l ega l controlled substances 
which property or evidence: 
EQO] 1s unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed. 
| [has been used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
I i 1s being possessed with the purpose to use i t as a 
1
—'means of committing or concealing a public offense. 
1
—' person or entity not a party "to the Illegal conduct 
and good cause being" shown that the seizure cannot 
be obtained by subpoena without the evidence being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered. (Conditions 
for service of this.warrant are included or attached 
hereto) 
You are therefore commanded: 
In the daytime 
at any time day or night (good cause having been shown) 
I I to execute without notice of authority or purpose, 1
—' (proof under oath being shown that the object of this 
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that 
harm may result to any person i f notice were given) 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), premises, 
and vehicle(s) for the herein-above described property or evidence and 
if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before 
re at the Justice Court, County of Millard, State of Utah, or retain 
such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
Given under my hand and dated this 18th day of May 
19 88 . 
• 
IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT, SaffifflfflK PRECINCT, 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
0Oo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF MILLARD} 
A F F I D A V I T FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Before RONALD R.' HARE , 715 So. Highway 99, Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Judge Address 
The undersigned being f i rs t duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. That he (is positive) (has reason to believe) that 
I on the person(s) of 
J [ on the premises at 
in the vehicle described as 1974 Oldsnotile Cutlass 
brown and tan in color, VTN 3J571WR187382 registered to 
Kevin Nield 
in the City of Fillmore , County of Millard 
State of Utah, there 1s now certain property described as: 
shop equipment, air tools, nig welder, desk calculator, auto 
tools stolen from Gerald D. Freenan, Fillmore Diesel, Fillmore, 
Utah on 05/17/88 during a burglary and i l legal • controlled substances 
Is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed. 
1 [has been used as a means of committing a public 
1
—'offense. 
] [ is being possessed with the purpose to use 1t as 
— a means of committing or concealing a public 
offense. 
rex consists of an item or constitutes evidence of 
i l legal conduct, possessed by a party to the 
i l legal conduct. 
1 consists of an item or constitutes 
1
—' il legal conduct, possessed by a per 
evidence of 
son or entity 
not a party to the illegal conduct. 
2. I believe the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime of Burglary and Theft. Possession of controlled 
substances . 
3. The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a 
Search Warrant are: (describe in detail all facts upon which affiant 
believes just i f ies the issuance of the Search Warrant): 
Affiant executed a Search Warrant at 12:15 AJ-L on May 18, 1983 
for the residence of Kevin Nield in Fillmore and also his known vehicle, 
a 1986 blue Chevrolet S-10 pickup pursuant to information received from 
a confidential informant concerning the burglary and theft of a local 
business, Fillmore Diesel, owned by one Gerald D. Freenan. Affiant did 
locate-iome •i .4 : •» :«»« > 1 * • : « ) . » : « • » . » » • « « • - ! • • # 
hand-tools, autoootive tools, painting tool similar to those reported 
stolen by Mr.Freeman, owner of Fillmore Diesel which was burglarized on 
05/17/88• However, those itens found did not constitute a l l i teas reported 
stolen. Pursuant to the execution of the aforementioned Search ifarrant, 
Affiant became aware of another vehicle owned by Kevin Nield, a 1974 
Olds Cutlass which Affiant was unaware of previously. Affiant also 
located i l l ega l controlled substances* in the residence-Of Xevin Nield 
pursuant to said search. 
4. The affiant considers the Information received from 
the confidential Informant reliable for the following reasons: 
(Complete only If Information relied on for Issuing the Search Warrant 
1s received from an unnamed informant and be specific) 
N/A 
5. The affiant has verified the above information to be 
correct and accurate through the following independent verification 
and investigation: (Complete only if information relied on for 
issuance of the Search Warrant is obtained from a third person) 
N/A 
WHEREFORE, Affiant prays that a Search Warrant "is issued* 
for the seizure of said items 
in the daytime only. 
there is reason 
necessary to seize the property 
prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, 
or altered, or for other good reason shown. 
I I at any tine day or night becaus-e 1 
'—to believe it is ; 
It 1s further requested that the affiant executing the 
requested Warrant not be required to give Notice of his authority 
or purpose because: (Conplete only if applicable and appropriate) 
I itne property sought may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted* or, 
• physical harm nay result to any person 1f notice were given. This danger 1s believed to exist 
because of the following facts: 
}fnV/
^t«r-
Subscribed and sworn to before we this /r day of 
^^Am^ 
- In the Justice Court of 
llmore Precinct, Millard County, 
State of Utah. 
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A Yes. 
Q And wi l l you t e l l us again, r e f r e sh our memory 
when tha t occurred, when the a r r e s t of Mr. Likes occurred? 
A That was approximately 2:30 in the a.m. the morning 
of the 17th . 
Q And where was Mr. Likes taken then af ter he vas 
ar res ted? 
A Millard County J a i l . 
Q You don' t need to go i n to a l l of the d e t a i l s but 
j u s t t e l l the Jury what bas i ca l ly happened to Mr. Likes then 
a f te r he was taken to the Mil lard County J a i l ? 
A He was processed through our f a c i l i t y , booked and 
f ingerpr in ted and photographed, and placed in a holding 
f a c i l i t y . 
Q And did you af ter t ha t period of time then i n t e r -
1 view Mr. Likes? | 
A Yes. 
Q About the Freeman burglary? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you t e l l the j u r y when t h a t took place? 
A I t took p lace at 1:00 o 'clock t h a t afternoon. 
Q The afternoon of the 17th? 
A Yes. 
Q And could you t e l l the jury where that interview 
of Mr. Likes took place? 
A The interview room at the Millard County Security 
Center. 
Q And who vas present during the interview? 
A Myself and Mr. Likes. 
Q And d±d you advise Mr. Likes as to the subject 
matter of the interview? 
A I did. 
Q Did Mr. Likes make a statement to you concerning 
the Fillmore Diesel burglary? 
A Yes. 
Q What did Mr. Likes tell you then during the inter-
view, basically? 
A Mr. Likss told me that he broke into the Fillmore 
Diesel, that he used a set of bolt-cutters to cut the lock, 
and that he took several items from the business and placed 
them in an undisclosed location somewhere in the Fillmore 
area. 
Q Did tbe interview cease then? 
A Yes. 
Q Would ycu tell the jury why it came to an end? 
A Mr. Likes requested to speak with an attorney. 
Q And what did you do with Mr. Likes then after he 
made that request? 
A He was placed back into the security portion of the 
facility. 
MR, ANDERSON: T h a t ' s a l l t h e q u e s t i o n s 
I h a v e , y o u r H o n o r . 
THE COURTz Do you h a v e any , Mr . C a r t e r ? 
MR. CARTER: I h a v e n o q u e s t i o n s . 
THE COURT: ¥r. Harmon? 
MR. HARMON: A few, y o u r Honor . 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARMON: 
Q O f f i c e r Cor ry , I t h i n k y e s t e r d a y you had i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s were a r r e s t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f - w a y t o 
t h r e e - q u a r t e r s t h r o u g h t h e s e a r c h a t t h e home? 
A Yes. 
Q And w e r e t h e y t a k e n t o t h e j a i l i m m e d i a t e l y a t t h e 
t ime of t h e i r a r r e s t , or d i d you keep them a t t h e home? 
A S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i r a r r e s t t h e y were removed from 
t h e p r e m i s e s . 
Q Did you s t a y a t t h e hone and f i n i s h t h e s e a r c h 
a f t e r t h a t , t h e n ? 
A I d i d . 
Q I g u e s s one q u e s t i o n t h a t we h a v e i s t h a t you went 
to t h e home a r o u n d 1:00 o ' c l o c k in t h e e v e n i n g w i t h t h e 
s e a r c h w a r r a n t . T h a t ' s n o t t h e u s u a l b u s i n e s s h o u r , cou ld 
you t e l l u s why you went t h e r e then? 
A That was t h e t i m e a f t e r t h e w a r r a n t s w e r e p r e p a r e d 
t h a t I e x e c u t e d t h e w a r r a n t s . 
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bathroom, 
Q 
equipment 
A 
Q 
and I b e l 
you said? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
i t s e l f ? 
A 
Q 
A 
a n a l y s i s 
k i t chen , c l o s e t s . 
Would you normally expect to f ind the type of shop 
in that type of res idence , o f f i cer? 
Not t h a t much. 
You have described the b o l t - c u t t e r s that ycu found, 
ieve you said i t was in that c l o s e t . Is that what 
Yes. 
And you took those into your possess ion? 
yes , I d id . 
And did you d i sp lay them to Mr. Freeman? 
Yes, I did. 
Did he ident i fy them? 
He s a i d they appeared to look l ike h i s . 
And were they a l s o otherwise t i e d into the burglary 
Yes, they were. 
Would you describe how to the Court? 
They were sent to the Utah State Crime Lab for 
of the t o o l markings of the chain that were used to 
secure the back door with the b o l t - c u t t e r s . 
Q 
prior t o 
A 
ins ide of 
And where-did Mr. Freeman have the b o l t - c u t t e r s 
the burglary? 
Those were supposedly i n s i d e one of h i s wreckers 
h is compound. | 
1 A No, e v e r y t h i n g was r e t u r n e d . 
2 Q And t h e b o l t - c u t t e r s w e r e k e p t b e c a u s e you w e n : 
3 and c h e c k e d w i t h Mr. Freeman t h e s u b s e q u e n t day and s a i d n a r e 
4 t h e s e y o u r s ? " and he s a i d " t h i s m a j be m i n e , i t may n e t be 
5 mine . 1 1 
6 A E i s i n i t i a l s , when I b r o u g h t h im i n t o go t h r o u g h 
7 t h e i t e m s t h a t I had s e i z e d f rom the s e a r c h w a r r a n t , i n c i c a t e 4 
8 t h a t t h e b o l t - c u t t e r s were h i s a t t h a t t i m e . 
9 Q A l l r i g h t . So what y e n did was w i t h t h e s e a r c h 
10 w a r r a n t , you went i n and g r a b b e d a l l of t h e shop t o o l s , a i r 
11 t o o l s and a u t o t o o l s you c o u l d f i n d and t h e n he went t h r o u g h 
12 them and s a i d " t h i s i s no t mineTr c r f l This i s nine1 1? 
13 A Y e s . 
14 Q A l l r i g h t . Rega rd ing t h e m a r i j u a n a and d r u g p a r a -
15 p h e r n a l i a , was t h e r e any i n d i c a t i o n o r comniun ica t ions t h a t yoij 
16 r e c e i v e d f rom Mr. Freeman o r anyone t h a t l e d you t o b e l i e v e 
17 t h a t t h e r e was such a s u b s t a n c e n p : n t h e r e s i d e n t s o r a t t h e 
18 r e s i d e n c e o f Mr. N i e l d ? 
19 A No. 
20 Q T h i s s e a r c h w a r r a n t a u t h o r i z e d t h a t , d i d i t nc r? 
21 Do you r e c a l l ? 
22 A I c a n ' t r e c a l l i f i t d i d o r n o t . 
23 Q Want t o l o o k a t i t ? L e t me r e a d i t t o y o u . I t 
24 s a y s — w e l l , where d i d you f i n d £3ie m a r i j u a n a , do you r e c a l l ? 
25 A I found p a r t of t h e c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e i n the 
4 
1 i Defendant's Exhibit No. 1? Would you please look at that 
2 • document? Does that appear to be a true ccpy of the search 
a warrant which was initiated by yourself and executed by Judge 
4 ' Hare? 
5 A Yes, s i r . 
6 • Q And upon that search warrant s e t forth i n Exhibit 
7 No. 1 there you conducted the search of the residence of Mr. 
8 Kevin Nield? 
9 A Yes, I did. 
10 Q All righr. Was there any other document which 
11 accompanied you in your search to the residence at 155 North 
12 100 West, Fillmore, U.ah? 
13 A No, sir. 
14 Q You did not have any list or inventory of any 
15 ; particular property? 
16 A No, sir. 
17 Q All right. In the search warrant it says that you 
1 
IS ' are looking for and, veil, it says that there is now being 
i 
19* j possessed and concealed person, property, evidence or property) 
20 described as shopping equipment, air tools, mig welder, 
21 ' desk calculators, auro tools, stolen from Gerald D. Freeman, 
22 Fillmore Diesel, Fillnore, Utah, on 5/17/85 during a burglary 
I 
23 j Is that correct? 
24 A Yes, sir-
25 Q And it is your handwriting there that appears upon 
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for items, you did not have a particular list of auto tools 
stolen from Geral D. Freeman? 
A I had a discussion with Mr. Freeman about different 
parts or different tools that I was looking for, but I did 
not have a List with me, no. 
Q All right. Did you have an itemization that there 
was shop equipment? 
A At the time? 
Q Itemization of the shop equipment that was missing 
from Mr. Freer^n's business at the time you did the search 
warrant? 
A No. 
Q Or air tools? 
A No. 
Q There was a ciig welder that was supposedly missing? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. A desk calculator? 
A Yes. 
Q And auto tools? 
A Yes. 
Q Although there was no particular description of 
the auto tools missing nor the shop equipment nor air tools? 
A Yes. 
Q That information was supplied to you the subsequent 
date, upon tine 18th of May? 
A No, sir. 
Q "No" there? 
A Right. 
Q There was not. All right. Was there any other 
itemization other than that generic term of air tools, shop 
equipment or auto tools? 
A No, sir. 
Q Was there a descr ipt ion of Mr. Gerald Freemanrs 
property given to you by the Ccurr on the issued due warrant 
se t t ing for th or d i s t inguish ing Xr. Freemansf a i r t o o l s , shop 
tools or auto too l s from any other shop too l s , a i r tools or 
auto too ls? 
A No, s i r . 
Q And when you searched what residence of Kevin 
Nield you searched it and you picked up all air tools, shop 
tools and auto tools that you found within the residence? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q All right. Did you knew that Mr. Nield had worked 
in the auto industry and had repaired vehicles? 
A I learned that from having conversation with him 
later, yes, sir. 
Q All r igh t* You did not know t h a t beforehand? 
A No, s i r , I did not . 
Q Would i t be safe to assume t h a t i f one walks into 
a residence of a metal worker there might be some too l s of 
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i 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Mr. 
They may belong t o Mr. N ie ld? 
P o s s i b l y . 
Or any o ther occupant of t h a t r e s i d e n c e ? 
P o s s i b l y . 
MR. CARTER: No f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . 
THE CCURT: Do you wish to c ross examine, 
Anderson? 
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your hcnor. 
MR. ANDERSON: I have some questions, 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY ME. ANDERSON: 
Q Officer , you indicated to counsel that: prior to 
conducting a search you had had a verbal discussion with Mr. 
Freeman about what was missing? 
A Yes, s i r . 
Q Did he describe the type of tools t h a t appeared to 
be missing during the burglary? 
A Yes, s i r . 
Q Could you articulate that for me a little bit, tell 
me, basically, as you recall what he told you was nissing? 
A He -indicated a mig welder, air tools, there was an 
orbit sander, colors, sockets, sizes, so forth. 
Q And did you have those things in mind then when you 
conducted the search? 
A Yes, I did. 
i-i 
1 
1 
2 ! 
3 
• 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q 
rot? 
Q 
would 
• 
have. 
All right, Ir was about two days later, was it 
One or two, I'm not sure. I think it was two days. 
All right, ir was on the 18th or the 19th then, 
that be correct? 
Yes. 1 
MR. CARTER: All right. That's all I 
Thank you. 
9 TEZ C0U3.T: Mr. A n d e r s o n . 
10 \ CROSS EXAMINATION 
11 . 3Y MR. ASDERSON: 
12 C Mr. F r eeman , had y o u , w e l l , a s I u n d e r s t a n d i t , 
13 O f f i c e r Corry a d v i s e d you a r t e r he d i s c o v e r e d a b r e a k - i n . I s 
14 , t h a t c o r r e c t ? 
15 A Yes , t h a t ' s r i g h t . He c a l l e d me a t home. 
16 Q Did y o u go t s y o u r b u s i n e s s t h e n t h a t v e r y e a r l y 
17 ; n o r n i n g hour? 
18 ; A Yes , I d i d . 
i 
19 j Q Did y o u examine o r look t h r o u g h your s h o p then f o r 
20 \ m i s s i n g i t e m s a t t h a t t i m e ? 
21 I A Yes, I , I t ock a q u i c k s c a n . I t was 3 : 0 0 o ' c l o c k 
i 
22 ; in the morning. I wasn't too coherent at the time. But I 
23 did look through the shop. 
24 I Q Did you find things that appeared to be missing that( 
25 you described to Officer Corry? 
